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Contracts - 1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
Paul1. Hartman*
I. ILLEGAL BARGAiNs-Ra-4EL ESTATE BRoiER'S COMMISSIONS-EFFECT OF
FAmxUE To PRocuE STATUTORY BOND
II. RENEWAL OF CONTRACr-PERFORMANCE AFrER EXPIRATION OF CONTRACT
Wrr FIXEr DURATION

Litigation in the field of contracts has been quite light during the period
covered by this survey.
I. ILLEGAL BARcAiNs-REAL ESTATE BROKER'S COMMISSIONS-EFFECT OF
FAiruRE To PRocuRE STATUTORY BOND

The Tennessee Supreme Court case of Acuff v. Barnes' involved the
question whether the failure of a real estate broker to give bond in conformity with a statutory requirement barred a recovery of his commission
for services in trying to sell real estate belonging to the owner.2 When the
complainant-broker sued the defendant-owner for his commission, one of the
defenses interposed against the claim was that the contract was illegal and
void because the broker had not given the bond required of real estate
agents by a Tennessee statute.3

The broker had paid the privilege tax for a license as a real estate broker
as required by statute, and he had filed with the county clerk a bond; but
it did not comply with the statute, in that the bond did not provide that it
was for the use and benefit of all persons who may be injured or aggrieved
by the wrongful act of default of such agent The statute also makes it
a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of real estate agent
without giving the bond required by the statute 5
In reversing both the trial court and the court of appeals, the Tennessee
Supreme Court denied recovery of the commission by the broker, even
though the broker had acted in good faith upon the advice of the county
court clerk who informed him that the bond in question would be sufficient
until the proper form of the bond could be made. The court was of the
opinion that the bond actually given by the broker was not in conformity
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 348 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1961).

2. The broker did not effect a sale but allegedly he had fully performed on his part
by finding an acceptable purchaser. See id. at 297.
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5102 (1956).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5102 (1956).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5112 (1956).
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with the statute; that compliance in exact conformity with the statute is
mandatory; that the clerk had no power or discretion to waive compliance
with the statute; and that the broker, having done the business without
having made a proper bond, cannot recover on a contract made by him.
Not only does the Acuff decision appear to be in line with the rationale
of the overwhelming weight of authority, but it makes the maximum
contribution to achievement of the objective of the statute requiring the
bond for the protection of persons who may be injured or aggrieved by the
wrongful act or default of real estate brokers. Where a statute requires a
broker to obtain a license before sales of the kind in question can be
negotiated by him, it seems clear that if such a sale is made by one acting
as a broker without the required license, he is not able to recover compensation for his services. 6 Recovery is denied even though the requisite
license has been procured after the deal has been initiated and before the
7
commission has become due.
Statutes may impose a tax upon the transaction of certain business merely
for the purpose of raising revenue, and not with any view of regulating the
business itself. Even though such statutes impose a penalty for failure to
comply with their provisions, contracts made without paying the requisite
tax or obtaining the requisite license generally are not thereby made unenforceable. 8 Of course, the legislature may provide that the failure to
comply with a revenue statute will invalidate a bargain.9 But where, as
in the Acuff case, the purpose of the statute is the protection of the public,
a bargain made in violation thereof generally will be held unenforceable,
even though it may incidentally raise revenue. 10
In such situations, not only will recovery usually be denied on contract,
but quasi contractual recovery likewise is generally denied." If it appears
that the bargain forming the basis of the action is opposed to public policy
or transgresses statutory prohibitions, the courts ordinarily give the plaintiff
no assistance, because courts do not wish to aid a man who founds his
6. Benham v. Heyde, 122 Colo. 233, 221 P.2d 1078 (1950); 6 WLiSTON, CONTRACTS

§ 1765 (rev. ed. 1938).

7. Burns v. Gartzman, 139 Pa. Super. 453, 11 A.2d 708 (Super. Ct. 1940); 6
WmLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1765 (rev. ed. 1938). See Houston v. Williams, 53 Cal. App.
267, 200 Pac. 55 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921); Calhoun v. Banner, 254 N.Y. 325, 172 N.E.
523 (1930), where the court permitted recovery where the real estate broker procured
the license after his employment but before he procured the purchaser.
8. Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky. 324, 246 S.W. 828 (1923); Coates v. Locust Point Co.,
102 Md. 291, 62 AUt. 625 (1905); 6 WMISTON, CONTRACTS § 1768 (rev. ed. 1938).
9. 6 WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1769 (rev. ed. 1938).
10. 6 WLiSTON, CONTRACTS § 1768 (rev. ed. 1938). But cf. John E. Rosaco
Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908 (1937), where a statute

required a license to sell milk, and it was a misdemeanor to sell without a license;
nevertheless a violation of the statute was not a defense.
11. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1786A (rev. ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 598 (1932).
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cause of action upon his own illegal act. The court's refusal to give aid is
not for the sake of the defendant, but because the court will not aid such
a plaintiff. Under this rationale, relief likely would have been denied in
the Acuff case even if the broker had sued in quasi contract.
II. RENEWAL OF CONTRACr-PERFoRmANCE AFTER EXPIRATION OF CONTRACT
'WITH F=IxD DURATION
The question in the Tennessee Court of Appeals case of Associated Press

v. WGNS, Inc.'2 was whether a five-year contract with a cancellation clause

on two years notice was terminable at will after performance beyond the

five years' expiration date. Plaintiff, Associated Press, entered into a written
contract with defendant, WGNS, Inc. which owns and operates a radio
station at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The contract obligated plaintiff to
furnish and defendant to accept teletype news service for the defendant
radio station at specified weekly charges. The original draft of the contract
provided that it would continue in force for five years from January 1,
1953, but the contract contained a clause that it could be terminated upon
two years' notice in writing by registered mail. However, at defendant's
request, in order to get a cheaper rate for its news, an additional clause
was inserted in the contract by which it was agreed that defendant would
not terminate the contract for five years, which assured that the contract
would continue until the termination date of January 1, 1958.
The parties performed under the contract from January 1, 1953, until

January 17, 1959. On January 14, 1959, defendant wrote plaintiff a letter
purporting to terminate the contract as of January 17, 1959, on the theory
that the contract had already expired on January 1, 1958. Defendant
refused further to perform under the contract. Treating this repudiation
as a breach of contract, plaintiff sued defendant for damages.
In the litigation that followed, defendant, by way of defense, claimed the
right to terminate the contract without further notice at any time after the
specified termination date of January 1, 1958, and that it had so terminated.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, insisted that the defendant lost its right to
terminate the contract on January 1, 1958, by continuing to give full
performance of the contractual obligation for more than one year after the
expiration date. Hence, plaintiff contended that defendant could terminate
only by giving the requisite two years written notice of termination.
In reversing the trial court, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
defendant had breached the contract and awarded plaintiff damages for
the breach. The court was of the opinion that the contract was not terminable at will by defendant after January 1, 1958, as defendant claimed. The
court further held that since defendant continued to accept services under
12. 348 S.W.2d 507 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
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the contract after the expiration date, the original contract was renewed;
thai the contract could not be cancelled except on two years' notice; and
that defendant's attemptto terminate at will constituted a breach of contract
for which defendant was liable in damages.
In holding that the continued performance by defendant of contractual
obligations after the expiration date of the contract constituted a renewal of
the original contract, the court is in accord with the relevant law as stated
by Professor Corbin in his monumental work on contracts. He summarizes
the law on this point in this manner:
Parties who have made an express contract to be in effect for one year (or
any other stated time) frequently proceed with performance after expiration
of the year without making any new express agreement, of extension or
otherwise. From such continued action a court may infer that the parties
have agreed in fact to renew the one-year contract for another similar period.
Illustrations can be found in leaseholds, employment transactions, and contracts for a continuing supply of some commodity.13
13. 1 CoIBiN, CoNTRAcTs § 18, at 36 (1950).

